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Abstract: 
The Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) spent the latter 
decades of the 20
th century fully integrating the surface and sub-surface drainage 
systems with the water distribution network in northern Victoria, thereby enabling 
complete recycling of outfalls, leaks and seepage from its channels. Yet in 2007, in 
repudiation of this recycling capacity, DSE announced a multibillion dollar 
modernisation project it claims will “create” 450 GL of “new water” by reducing 
“inefficiencies” in the channel distribution system.  
Examination of the northern Victorian irrigation supply system shows it was fully 
integrated with more than adequate recycling capacity before the project began. In a 
classic case of double counting, DSE was already delivering the illusory “new water” 
to regional irrigators and billing them for it. Thus the project cannot deliver real 
water savings and the Government must effectively reduce irrigation entitlement to 
increase entitlements for urban consumption and environmental flows.  
The financial and economic impact of bogus water savings on stakeholders is 
discussed in terms of the opportunity cost of appropriated irrigation entitlement and 
of the effect of overcapitalisation of the distribution system on annual capital charges 
and thus the viability of irrigation and the operating water authority.   2
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The Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) spent the latter decades 
of the 20
th century fully integrating the surface and sub-surface drainage systems with the 
water distribution network in northern Victoria, thereby enabling complete recycling of 
outfalls, leaks and seepage from its channels. Yet in 2007, in repudiation of this recycling 
capacity, DSE announced a multibillion dollar modernisation project it claims will “create” 
450 GL of “new water” by reducing “inefficiencies” in the channel distribution system.  
Examination of the northern Victorian irrigation supply system shows it was fully integrated 
with more than adequate recycling capacity before the project began. In a classic case of 
double counting, DSE was already delivering the illusory “new water” to regional irrigators 
and billing them for it. Thus the project cannot deliver real water savings and the Government 
must effectively reduce irrigation entitlement to increase entitlements for urban consumption 
and environmental flows.  
The financial and economic impact of bogus water savings on stakeholders is discussed in 
terms of the opportunity cost of appropriated irrigation entitlement and of the effect of 
overcapitalisation of the distribution system on annual capital charges and thus the viability of 
irrigation and the operating water authority. 
Key words: double counting, opportunity cost, real water savings, recycling. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Design and funding of major water resource management projects in 
northern Victoria.  
1.1.1  Multi-agency working groups with stakeholder consultation leading to 
community and government joint action 
In the latter decades of the twentieth century, government funded research and development 
produce a range of technical options for the management of salinity and nutrient pollution in 
the irrigation regions of northern Victoria. Options were selected by multi-agency technical 
working groups and submitted together with cost sharing proposals from local communities as 
draft plans for the sustainable management of land and water resources
3. These plans were 
                                                      
1 A working paper for presentation at the AARES conference in Melbourne, February 2011 
2 Registered office, 92 Binney St, Euroa, Victoria 3666 
3 SPAC Draft Plan and Working Papers (1989)   3
assessed using an economic benefit: cost analysis framework
4 as set out in treasury 
guidelines. Component programs were ranked on the basis of net present value, benefit: cost 
ratio and internal rate of return, with only those with a positive net present value being 
eligible for government funding unless large unvalued social or environmental benefits were 
identified. In some cases, draft plans were not approved until particular programs were 
redesigned to yield a net benefit
5.  
Thus the program of works to complete the construction of the surface and subsurface 
drainage systems and their integration with the water distribution system in northern Victoria 
was designed to be technically feasible, maintain equity, improve economic efficiency and 
avoid overcapitalisation of the water distribution system. 
 
The Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE)
6 was and is responsible for the 
coordination of the drafting, funding, implementation and monitoring of the Land and Water 
Management Plans for northern Victoria. 
1.1.2  Single agency project teams with expert dependent consultancies 
In contrast to the method of project planning outlined above, DSE has more recently 
employed a different approach in which the information used as the basis for a benefit: cost 
analysis is “selected” by staff, consultants and equipment suppliers. This process can be 
expedient but is an arrangement lacking adequate time and resources for the open forum peer 
review processes which can identify both absurd or inconsistent information about possible 
project options and faulty specification of the ‘base case’ scenario against which they are to 
be compared. Probity and due process may be casualties in this approach. Therefore faulty 
benefit: cost analysis can result through the unwitting use of spurious data. In the case of 
water savings projects, illogical technical analysis will lead to bogus water savings. 
A characteristic of this planning approach is that there is very little direct communication or 
real consultation with individual stakeholders. The project plan is simply presented as fait 
accompli. 
1.1.2.1  The Food Bowl Modernisation Project 
The Food Bowl Modernisation Project in northern Victoria is an example of a project born of 
the non-inclusive approach. It is a deal between the Victorian Government and a self 
appointed elite regional interest group called the Food Bowl Alliance. The first part of this 
deal involves a billion dollar investment in irrigation infrastructure in the Goulburn 
                                                      
4 For example, see Dumsday et al, 1990 
5 Dumsday et al op cit recommend exploring a range of options to find those with higher BCRs 
6 DSE and its otherwise named antecedents.   4
component of the irrigation water distribution system
7 which DSE (2007) claims will “create 
225 GL of new water” through the reduction in “losses due to system inefficiency”. It is 
proposed this “new water” will be equally allocated as new entitlements being 75 GL for 
urban water users outside the Goulburn basin, 75 GL for the environment and 75 GL for 
Goulburn system high security irrigation water entitlement holders.  
In contrast to the enthusiasm of the proponents of this project, a public meeting of irrigators 
and other affected groups voted against the project and passed a motion repudiating any claim 
made by the Food Bowl Alliance of universal support for the Food Bowl deal. Irrigators are 
doubtful that significant real water savings can be made and consider that the 225 GL of “new 
water” will not be obtained. These irrigators see themselves as victims in scheme to “rob 
Peter to pay Paul” whereby “dry”, or in reality non-existent, water savings result in the 
appropriation and transfer of existing local water entitlements to distant water users (Seckler, 
1996). 
This paper has three main aims:- 
Firstly, to assess the potential for real water savings. 
Secondly, to consider the financial and economic impact on stakeholders in the proposed 
project and, 
Thirdly, to discuss some alternative policy options for the management of the distribution and 
delivery of water resources in northern Victoria. 
2.  WATER FLOWS AND CONCEPTS OF SYSTEM EFFICIENCY 
2.1  The nature of water flows in the Goulburn channel system 
A diagrammatic longitudinal section of a distribution channel showing different categories of 
water flow is depicted in Figure 1. 
                                                      
7 The Goulburn irrigation system is a major component of the Goulburn-Murray irrigation system in 
the northern region of Victoria, Australia. It is a gravity supply channel system operated by Goulburn-
Murray Water (G-MW), the government owned monopoly responsible for the supply of water to 
customers in northern Victorian under a number of Bulk Water Entitlements. The state of Victoria is 
also committed to deliver water to South Australia via the Murray River for urban/industrial, 
environmental and agricultural use. DSE advises and supports the Minister for Water who is 
responsible for the direction of Goulburn-Murray Water in the performance its duties. 
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The seasonal volume of different categories of water flow reported by G-MW for a manually 
operated channel (Douglass et al, 2000) is shown in Table 2. The major categories of flow, 
inflow, metered delivery and outfalls, were continuously measured over four seasons from 
1996-97 to 1999-2000.  
After allowance for meter inaccuracy and unmetered Domestic and stock water, total 
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Figure 1: Categories of water flows into and out of a distribution channel. 
Table 1: Categories of water flows in distribution channels 
1. Inflow 
 
Water from upstream is released into the head of the 
channel through a flow regulating and measuring 
structure 
2. Outlet to farm 
Water is delivered to farm through a regulating outlet 
generally fitted with a water meter 
3. Leaks 
Water escapes from the channel through leaks in the 
bank or around regulating structures 
4. Evaporation   Water evaporates from the upper surface of the channel 
5. Seepage  Water seeps through the bottom of the channel 
6. Outfall 
Surplus water flows through the downstream regulating 
and measuring structure   6
 
2.1.1   “Distribution Efficiency” 
G-MW calculates the “distribution efficiency” of its separate channel systems as metered 
deliveries to farms divided by inflow. Using the example of Douglass et al’s data in Table 2, 
G-MW would report a distribution efficiency of 77 per cent. This level of distribution 
efficiency is generally consistent with that reported for channels in the Goulburn system over 
most of the last three decades by G-MW and its antecedents the State Rivers and Water 
Supply Commission and Rural Water Commission. SRWSC management noted that although 
the distribution efficiency for the Central Goulburn Irrigation Area was 87 per cent in 
1979/80, “that up to 1994, Central Goulburn Area efficiencies were maintained at levels close 
to 80 percent with some traditional drop off in lower delivery years”
8. 
The term “distribution efficiency” conjures up the axiomatic concept of “losses due to system 
inefficiency” which implies all water other than metered deliveries to farms is lost from the 
system. Looking at undelivered channel outflows in isolation suggests the possibility of large 
potential for water savings. But in reality water undelivered in one part of the system can 
simply become water in transit to a point of delivery further downstream if the channel is part 
                                                      
8 If the distribution efficiencies reported by SRWSC are increased by 6.6 percent to allow for potential 
meter inaccuracy and unmetered stock and domestic supplies, they would be 93.6 per cent and 
86.6 percent respectively. 
Table 2: Seasonal water flows in a G-MW channel (Douglass et al, 2000) 
Categories of water flow  ML  % 
Total Inflow  6153   
Recorded via Metered Outlet  4764  77.4 
Potential Meter Inaccuracy  308  5.0 
Unmetered Domestic & Stock water  97  1.6 
Outlet leakage  120  2.0 
Leakage Channel  71  1.2 
Outfalls 786  12.8 
Seepage   38  0.6 
Evaporation 90  1.5 
Unaccounted for water  -122  -2.0 
Total Outflows  6153  100.0   7
of an integrated water management system. This is the case for the Goulburn system as shown 
in Appendix I. 
2.1.2   “Delivered” and “Undelivered” channel outflows 
Douglass et al recognise that the calculation of distribution efficiency should be based on the 
total real volume of water delivered to customers. After including the estimated volume of un-
metered “Domestic and Stock” water and allowing for the estimated under recording by water 
meters they calculated a distribution efficiency of 83%. In a physical sense, “Outlet leakage” 
is also a delivered outflow in that the water is directly consumed albeit without there being a 
valid entitlement to its use. 
The other outflows shown in Figure 1 may be termed “undelivered channel outflows”. 
2.2  Current Fate of Undelivered Channel Outflows 
2.2.1  Evaporation 
Evaporation from the surface of the channel system is an irretrievable water loss. Evaporation 
is partly offset by rainfall on the channel surface. 
The modernisation project is not designed to eliminate evaporation. 
2.2.2  Seepage 
Water that seeps below the bottom of the channel supplements existing groundwater 
resources.  
The fact that surface and ground waters are interconnected is accepted by G-MW (Diversions 
division, 2008) who published the block diagram in Figure 2 showing a “losing stream” 
recharging the underlying groundwater system in a manner analogous to seepage from a 
channel. 
 
Figure 2: Seepage from a losing stream recharging the groundwater system. (After Winter et al 
1998) 
Groundwater is extensively pumped for irrigation use in the Goulburn region at rates causing 
the groundwater reserves to shrink (Anon, 2008). The regional groundwater management 
program is supervised by DSE.   8
G-MW is paid by Government to pump groundwater which it either returns to the channel 
system or outfalls into the drainage system. G-MW charges irrigators for using the 
groundwater it pumps into channels and drains and charges private groundwater pumpers for 
their use of groundwater. 
Seepage from channels is thus recycled by activities approved and monitored by DSE. 
2.2.3  Outfalls  
Outflows from the end of the distribution channel fall into the next downstream component of 
the total connected water resource management system. This system has been designed by 
DSE/G-MW so that outfalls from the upstream component become inflows for the next 
section downstream such as another distribution channel, a surface drain or return flow into 
the river.  
Outfalls are thus re-diverted by G-MW for delivery to irrigators, pumped by licensed drain 
diverters who pay annual fees to G-MW, or transported by the river for delivery to 
downstream water authorities under State and Federal agreements. 
A small proportion feeds swamps and wetlands for environmental purposes. 
The regional surface drainage program is supervised by DSE.  
Outfalls from channels are thus recycled by activities approved and monitored by DSE. 
2.2.4  Channel Leakage 
Leakage from channel banks and structures either outfalls into downstream channels or drains 
and is subsequently reused by downstream irrigators including licensed drain diverters, or it 
may flow onto farm land, or seep into the groundwater system.  Leakage intercepted by farm 
drains and used for irrigation via a recycle system could be termed a delivered outflow. 
Improved farm drainage and construction of recycle systems is subsidised and monitored by 
DSE. 
Thus leakage from channels is recycled by activities approved and monitored by DSE. 
   9
2.3  Diagrammatic representation of the immediate destination of undelivered outflows 
from a channel within the G-MW distribution system  
 
The diagram in Figure 3 shows the immediate destination of undelivered outflows leaving a 
channel within the G-MW channel system. Appendix  1 shows that the integration of the 
channel system with the DSE’s northern Victorian water management system enables 
recycling of water in transit further down the distribution system. 
Surplus flows within the channel system outfall to drains which return water to the river 
system. Thus return flows from the Murray Valley, Shepparton, Central Goulburn and 
Rochester-Campaspe irrigation areas become inflows for the Torrumbarry irrigation area. The 
river town of Swan Hill, situated 133 river kilometres downstream from Torrumbarry Weir 
and 1505 river kilometres upstream from the mouth of the Murray River (MDBC, 2006), is 
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close to the western border of the G-MW channel system. As G-MW has delivery 
commitments for both Victorian and South Australian irrigation and for urban diverters and 
environmental flows downstream of the channel system, any water returning to the river that 
is not recycled within the channel system, including outflows from both the Torrumbarry and 
Pyramid-Boort irrigation areas, will help supply those requirements below the channel 
system. It can be readily seen that there is no potential for DSE to obtain real water savings so 
long as there is sufficient capacity to recycle drainage flows within its total water delivery 
system. 
2.4  The DSE view of the fate of undelivered channel outflows. 
The current view of senior DSE management of the fate of undelivered channel outflows is 
illustrated in Figure 4.  
Keller et al (1996) describe this concept of water management as being one where “drainage 
water is treated as though it flows to an ultimate “sink”. It simply drops out of the 
system, or “disappears”. 
 
Outlet 




Ocean of Losses 
Figure 4: The DSE view of the fate of undelivered outflows in the G-MW channel 
distribution system   11
DSE (2007) has published expected diversions and metered deliveries for the Goulburn and 
Murray components of the G-MW channel distribution system for average and reduced inflow 
scenarios as shown in Table 3. 
 
All diverted water (inflow to the channel system) other than metered deliveries is treated by 
DSE as being “losses due to system inefficiency”. DSE claims that 870 GL are lost every year 
due to system inefficiency. 
DSE has not explained where this “ocean of losses” or ultimate sink is situated or how 
sufficient capacity exists to dispose of 870 GL every year. To annually dispose of 870 GL by 
evaporation a lake of at least 870 square kilometers in area would be required. The Southern 
Ocean could dispose of 870 GL of drainage water but this sink lies at Goolwa 1500 river 
Murray River kilometres downstream of the G-MW channel system (Fig. 2, App 1). DSE has 
not revealed the whereabouts of an undiscovered lake capable of evaporating 870 GL of 
perfectly acceptable irrigation water every year. Nor has it described a mechanism by which 
870 GL of water could slip down the Murray River and into the sea completely unnoticed.  
G-MW and DSE reports show water is not accumulating in the regional groundwater system. 
Therefore there is no ultimate sink for undelivered channel outflows, and the DSE concept of 
“losses due to system inefficiency” is nonsense. 
Table 3: Expected diversions and metered deliveries (GL) within the Goulburn and 
Murray components of the G-MW channel distribution system under average 
and reduced catchment runoff conditions. (After DSE, 2007) 
 




Average Reduced Average  Reduced  Average  Reduced 
Diversions  1780 1350 1110  985 2890  2335 
Metered 
Deliveries  1305 932 715  623  2020 1555 
“Losses due to 
system 
inefficiency” 
475 418 395  362 870  780 
“Total System 
Efficiency”    69%   63%   67%   12
The only plausible explanation for the non-accumulation of 870 GL of undelivered channel 
outflows is that this water is being recycled within the G-MW/DSE system. As Keller et al 
(1996) observe that:-  
“in practically all integrated water management systems, however, the 
drainage water stays in the system and is incorporated into the initial 
water supply for additional irrigation applications”. 
3.  PROSPECTS FOR REAL WATER SAVINGS 
3.1  Integrated Water Management Systems: A logical framework for the assessment of 
real water savings 
Integrated water management systems (IWMS) recycle surface and subsurface drainage. In 
these systems, channel seepage, leakage and outfalls in one part of the system contribute to 
the water supply for other parts. Awareness of the degree to which the system is integrated 
can guard against logically flawed water savings proposals and avoid unnecessary 
replacement or duplication of expensive infrastructure. For example in Egypt by using the 
IWMS concept as the analytical framework Keller et al (1995) showed that “If water reuse is 
accounted for, the scope for real water savings through engineering interventions is 
much less important than previously thought.” and “efficiency gains at the canal level 
are outweighed by the reduced opportunity for reuse downstream.” 
 
Thus DSE’s claim that “leaky sections and inefficient operation result in up to 30 per cent of 
the total volume being lost.” is a case in point. And it follows that if DSE used a sensible 
water accounting framework and “If water reuse is accounted for, the scope for real water 
savings through engineering interventions is much less important than previously 
thought.” Section 2 shows the Goulburn-Murray distribution system is fully integrated with 
the surface and sub-surface drainage systems. Therefore, apart from reduced evaporation, 
there is virtually no potential for real water savings arising from the Food Bowl 
Modernisation project. The project is not designed to significantly reduce evaporation. 
In relation to the concept of distribution efficiency as calculated by G-MW in section 2.1.1 
above and the illusion of potential water savings, Seckler (1996) states that  
“The fundamental problem with the concept of water use efficiency 
based [solely] on supply, that is, diversion to a project, is that it considers 
inefficient both the evaporative loss of water and the drainage water. 
This is invalid for that part of the drainage water which can be reused. 
To overcome this confusion in the concept of water use efficiency, 
knowledgeable people now distinguish between “real” water savings and   13
“paper” water savings or, as they say in California, between “wet” and 
“dry” water savings”. 
3.2  Estimating the Volume of Potential Real Water Savings 
The potential volume of real water savings depends on the volume of non-recycled 
undelivered channel outflows. But, as the preceding sections show that virtually all drainage 
water is recycled, there can be no significant volume of real water savings. Therefore the 
estimated volume of real water savings is close to zero. 
The Food Bowl Modernisation Project is a simply a scheme to appropriate existing 
entitlements to irrigation water and transfer them to other users. So the question then becomes 
“What volume of water is appropriated from the different classes of irrigation water 
entitlement holders and what are the financial and economic consequences?” 
4.  IMPACT ON STAKEHOLDERS 
4.1  The without project scenario. 
The base case against which the Food Bowl Modernisation Project is compared in this 
analysis is different to that assumed by the Food Bowl proponents in which sloppy 
maintenance and operation is assumed to generate high volumes of channel leakage and 
outfalls. In the Food Bowl Modernisation Project such incompetent management is assumed 
to be endemic thereby creating the “necessity” of capital intensive automatic equipment. Yet 
such an investment appears doomed if management is incompetent. 
The base case for this assessment assumes no major investment in new infrastructure but 
rather that the system wide management of GM-W is if necessary made competent and is 
capable of producing the pre-existing flow pattern benchmarked by Douglass et al (2000). 
This ensures the recycling capacity of the integrated system is not exceeded while also 
avoiding increasing the risk of overcapitalization. 
It is also assumed that the existing Dethridge meter outlets are made compliant with new 
national measurement requirements by:- 
1.  Maintaining all meters to the high standard already achieved at minimal cost by 
some diligent water services committees. 
2.  Increasing the calibration factor
9. 
3.  Adjusting readings based on existing calibration curves
10 to account for flow rate and 
supply level. 
                                                      
9 New national measurement requirements are that meter readings shoul be within ± 5% of true volume.   14
Recent in situ testing of meter outlets is testament to the generally low standard, or total lack 
of maintenance of meters in some water service areas (G-MW, 2009).  
4.2  Volume lost by different classes of irrigation water entitlement holders under the Food 
Bowl scheme 
For total system average deliveries of 1171 GL
11 different classes would lose access to the 
following volumes annually:- 
4.2.1  Groundwater licensees 
Assuming the project reduces channel seepage by 50%, groundwater pumpers would lose 
access to around 5 GL. 
4.2.2  Surface Drainage Diverters 
If 50% of outfalls and channel leaks currently return to the river for recycling by G-MW 
(Nayar, 2006), drainage diverters would lose access to approximately 106 GL. 
4.2.3  Channel Supplied Irrigators 
At first glance it seems that all the extra volume of water irrigators receive due to under 
recording of deliveries by Dethridge meters is a potential saving and therefore the use of 
accurate meters would save a volume equal to metered deliveries multiplied by the meter 
error every year. This is not the case however because the full volume of entitlement is not 
allocated every year. And transfer of surplus irrigation entitlement to the environment does 
not start before both high and low security entitlement are fully allocated.  
If Dethridge meters are under recording, more accurate measurement of retail deliveries to 
channel supplied irrigators will reduce the volume released from storage to supply the annual 
allocation. But savings do not become available for the environment
12 until the volume of the 
irrigators’ share of the run of the river in storage exceeds the volume required to fully supply 
the irrigation bulk entitlement. 
In the Goulburn system for volumes of 968 GL and 436 GL of high reliability and low 
reliability water share respectively, and an under recording inaccuracy of five percent, no 
oversupply of entitlement would occur until the total meter reading of deliveries exceeds 
1336 GL. There is a reason for the term “low reliability” meaning this class of water share is 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 SRWSC Drawing No:136 224 - Standard Large Dethridge Meter Rating Graphs 
11 Equivalent to 1.2 times the volume of high reliability water share. 
12 The total volume of low reliability water share issued was limited to 45% of the total volume of high 
reliability water share.   15
rarely fully allocated. The total annual allocation on the Goulburn system has not exceeded 
138% of high reliability water share since 1996/97. 
Assuming the total annual allocation on the Goulburn system exceeds 138% and reaches 
145% one year in ten, the average annual additional volume of water that would be taken 
from the irrigation bulk entitlement pool, or share of the run of the river, and directed to the 
environment would be 7 GL. This is a much smaller volume than the 70 GL which is 
equivalent to 5% of metered deliveries every year. The under recording of deliveries is mainly 
an equity issue for channel supplied irrigators because when high reliability water share 
holders are allocated their full entitlement they get five percent extra volume before low 
reliability water share holders are given an allocation. Low reliability water share holders lose 
eleven percent of their entitlement under such circumstances. It does not become an equity 
issue in terms of losses for the environment until the annual allocation exceeds 138%. 
Any shortfall remaining in the desired 150 GL combined increase in urban and environmental 
bulk entitlements would be appropriated from the annual allocation of channel irrigators. 
4.3  Ownership of “Savings” 
G-MW does not own any bulk water entitlement. It is responsible for storing and delivering 
water to entitlement holders. Irrigation releases from the G-MW storage and distribution 
system is the property of irrigation water share entitlement holders.  
As measures taken to reduce the volume of channel outfalls, leaks and seepage result in more 
irrigation water remaining in the channel distribution system this increase in retained water is 
the property of irrigation water share entitlement holders. This tenure holds regardless of 
whether reduced volumes of outfalls and leaks are due to improved management or 
replacement of existing equipment. 
G-MW does have jurisdiction over water in drains and licenses drainage diversion and 
groundwater pumping. Drainage and groundwater pumping licences may specify maximum 
allowable diversions but do not guarantee minimum volumes of supply. Licences are for fixed 
terms and may be renewed. Therefore these classes of entitlement holders may be 
disenfranchised with no acknowledgement of their contribution to the salinity and nutrient 
management programs. No assessment of the impact of reduced pumping on the effectiveness 
of the management programs appears to have been made. 
4.4  Value of water appropriated from different classes of irrigators 
The price paid by government for recent water entitlement buybacks using offers tendered by 
irrigators has been around $2000 to $2400 per megalitre. Subtracting an infra structure access   16
termination fee of $350 per megalitre and making allowance for varying temporary trading 
opportunities yields a net price of $1650 per megalitre.  
4.4.1  Groundwater licensees 
On this basis, the present value of 5 GL of water seeping from channels into the groundwater 
every year is $8 million.  
4.4.2  Surface Drainage Diverters 
The present value of 106 GL of outfalls and leaks pumped by drainage diverters every year is 
$175 million. 
4.4.3  Channel Supplied Irrigators 
The present value of an annual average of 7 GL of irrigation bulk entitlement transferred to 
the environment under a more accurate measurement regime is $12 million. 
To bring the total volume transferred from irrigation to urban and environmental bulk 
entitlements to 150 GL, an additional 33 GL of irrigation bulk entitlement valued at $54 
million would be appropriated the under the guise of additional bogus savings invented by the 
exaggeration of meter errors, outfalls and leaks occurring under the slack management 
allowed in the DSE “without project” scenario. 
4.4.4  Total appropriated from Irrigators 
Putting aside the 7 GL transferred to the environment to account for improvements in 
accuracy of metering, the total value of 143 GL water appropriated from irrigators is $236 
million. Using an input output multiplier of three, the impact on the regional economy of 
reduced irrigated activity would be $708 million. 
4.5  Financial Impact on stake holders  
The estimated losses suffered, or increases in costs imposed on different groups of 
stakeholders are shown below.  
4.5.1  Goulburn Irrigators 
Apart from all classes of irrigators in general losing access to 150 GL of water, channel 
irrigators are expected to contribute $100 million to construction costs. This sum is supposed 
to pay for 75 GL of entitlement to bogus “new water” and improved water services. A trial of 
new equipment resulted in a deterioration of the quality of water services.  
Channel irrigators are also expected to pay a rate of return on the capital value of new 
infrastructure and contribute to a sinking fund (Chisholm and Dillon, 1988) to finance 
replacement of new infrastructure. The estimate of capital charges includes a required rate of   17
return of five percent and is based on an average asset life of 50 years, levied in perpetuity. A 
project construction cost of $1 billion is assumed. This estimate is likely to be significantly 
exceeded. It is assumed that the renewals charges for existing regulators and outlets are offset 
by increased maintenance costs of the new equipment. 
Table 4: Financial impact on Goulburn irrigators 
Loss/Cost Increase  Estimated present value ($million) 
Lost access to water  236  
Contribution to construction costs  100 
Increased capital charges   1000 
Total 1336 
4.5.2  Melbourne Water Customers 
Melbourne water customers are expected to contribute $300 million to the cost of the 
Goulburn component of the FBMP. On the basis of present market prices for water 
entitlement, 75 GL of high security entitlement could be purchased for $124 million 
Table 5: Financial impact on Melbourne Water customers 
Loss/Cost Increase  Estimated present value ($million) 
Higher cost for 75 GL of urban water   176  
4.5.3  Regional Economy 
This loss is based on the value of reduced irrigation activity. No allowance has been made for 
reduced consumer spending as irrigators struggle to service the increased capital costs of the 
irrigation system. 
Table 6: Financial impact on regional economy 
Loss/Cost Increase  Estimated present value ($million) 
Reduced economic activity  708  
4.5.4  Victorian Community 
The wider Victorian community is expected to contribute $600 million to the cost of the 
Goulburn component of the FBMP. On the basis of present market prices for water 
entitlement, 75 GL of high security entitlement could be purchased for $124 million. 
 
   18
Table 7: Financial impact on Victorian community 
Loss/Cost Increase  Estimated present value ($million) 




5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1  Promoters of the Food Bowl Modernisation Project have not shown how 
their claimed losses disappear. 
This comparison between options for obtaining more water for the environment and 
Melbourne relies on the assumption that virtually all the undelivered outflows from the 
channel system were already recycled within the boundaries of the water distribution system 
in northern Victoria before the inception of the FBMP. The technical material used in the 
drafting of the land and water management plans previously adopted and monitored by DSE 
supports this contention. Those who disagree with that assumption must show how 870 GL of 
water are lost every year through evaporation or by disappearing into a very saline water 
body. Otherwise they must concede that the FBMP will have the effect of a scheme to 
appropriate 150 GL of the Goulburn region’s irrigation water. 
And in so conceding, they must also admit they have ignored the opportunity cost of the water 
they seek to appropriate from the owners of irrigation entitlement. 
5.2  Issues in Equity and Efficiency 
A properly resourced benefit: cost analysis based on sound information produced by multi-
agency working groups and community forums, and compliance with Treasury investment 
appraisal guidelines would ensure government departments avoid unprofitable investments in 
irrigation infrastructure. But the government department must believe its role is to increase 
net social welfare. DSE did commission a limited ex ante benefit: cost analysis (URS, 2004) 
which showed that the Food Bowl Modernisation Project did not meet Treasury’s economic 
criteria. And it ignored it. 
In view of the absurd nature of DSE’s claimed water savings and the dubious legality of their 
appropriation by government, it is highly inequitable that irrigators on the channel system are 
expected to pay all the capital charges for the new FBMP infrastructure in perpetuity. If the 
government is appropriating irrigation bulk entitlement in perpetuity it should maintain and 
replace the new the infrastructure in perpetuity. It also should not expect irrigators to pay an 
annual dividend on the cost of construction of the new infrastructure. Otherwise channel 
irrigators will be charged $55 million every year to pay for unnecessary overcapitalisation of   19
the system. This trebling in capital charges would substantially reduce the profitability of 
irrigation in the Goulburn system relative to that in other states and districts. In the 
government sector a desire for fairness might raise the solution for early irrigation schemes 
described by Davidson (1969) where “the Pike judgement of 1926 established the principle 
that a farmer could only repay from the profits he earned, and that this was not related to the 
cost of supplying him with water”. But some farm management economics would be needed 
to determine that. 
 
The trebling of capital charges would also triple exit fees to $1050/ ML on water entitlement 
leaving the Goulburn system. In terms of encouraging the market based redistribution of 
property rights to water resources, few contracts would be written under the inhibiting 
influence of such horrendous transaction costs. This trade barrier would underpin a sinecure 
that more greatly rewarded inefficient management of a monopoly the more it overcapitalised 
the system. In a competitive market such financially inefficient providers of water services 
would simply go out of business. A new management may acquire the distribution assets for a 
price not exceeding the present value of expected net returns and aspire to profitable 
operations. Or in the absence of a new operator, and given normal transaction costs, the 
undeliverable water rights would be sold to users in other areas. The former alternative would 
appear to be preferable for the economy of the Goulburn region. 
 
The increasing demand for environmental flows will further accentuate the need to rationalise 
the area and location of irrigation in northern Victoria. Overcapitalisation of a system 
delivering smaller volumes of water is not the recipe for financial sustainability. It would 
have been better to substitute efficiently managed labour for capital so that operating and 
capital costs became competitive with other systems. Avoidance of investment in expensive 
long term infrastructure before the pattern of distribution is determined would be the prudent 
approach. 
 
Channel irrigators are also expected to pay $100 million up front as a contribution to 
installation of the FBMP infrastructure. This supposedly offset by the benefits of improved 
water services. Like the bogus water savings component of the FBMP, the claimed outcomes 
are obtainable far more cheaply. But that is another story. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The FBMP will appropriate 150 GL water for Melbourne and the environment at a vastly 
increased cost to that of the alternative option of purchasing water entitlement through the 
market. The latter option would compensate irrigators for loss of irrigated production.   20
The estimated total increase in costs for the Victorian community is $1.8 billion. 
Table 8: Estimated total increase in costs for the Victorian community 
Loss/Cost Increase  Estimated present value ($million) 
Irrigator’s contribution to construction 
costs 
100 
Increased capital charges for irrigators  1000 
Increased cost for 75 GL of urban water 
entitlement 
176  
Increased cost for 75 GL of 




It is assumed that economic return from irrigation, urban and environmental uses is equal at 
the margin of current levels of water use. 
The estimated total increase in costs for the Goulburn regional community is $2 billion. 
Table 9: Estimated total increase in costs for the Goulburn regional community 
Loss/Cost Increase  Estimated present value ($million) 
Lost access to water  236  
Irrigator’s contribution to construction 
costs 
100 
Increased capital charges for irrigators  1000 
Reduced economic activity  708 
Total 2044 
 
If rather than appropriating bogus water savings via the Food Bowl fiasco, 150 GL of water 
entitlement is purchased from the Goulburn system for urban or environment use elsewhere 
than in the Goulburn region, the cost to the local community would be $944 million in terms 
of the loss of production and associated economic activity less $236 million income from 
water sales or $708 million.   21
The other benefits claimed for the new distribution infrastructure have not been subject to a 
critical review. However experience with a trial of the system indicated that benefits were 
overestimated and obtainable at lower cost employing other methods. The general non-
adoption of these alternatives prior to the trial suggests the value of other benefits is close to 
zero. Therefore the Food Bowl Modernisation Project will cost the region $1.3 billion more 
than the water market solution.  
All in all not a great way to assist a regional community and its economy already under stress 
from increasing demands for environmental flows while squandering funding that might have 
been used for worthwhile projects elsewhere in Victoria at the same time.   22
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APPENDIX I 
 
THE GOULBURN IRRIGATION SYSTEM AS PART OF DSE’S INTEGRATED 
WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR NORTHERN VICTORIA 
The Goulburn irrigation system is a major component of the Goulburn-Murray irrigation 
system in the northern region of Victoria, Australia. It is a gravity supply channel system 
operated by Goulburn-Murray Water (G-MW), the government owned monopoly responsible 
for the supply of water to customers in northern Victorian under a number of Bulk Water 
Entitlements. The state of Victoria is also committed to deliver water to South Australia via 
the Murray River for urban/industrial, environmental and agricultural use. The Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (DSE) advises and supports the Minister for Water who is 
responsible for the direction of Goulburn-Murray Water in the performance its duties. 
The state of Victoria lies in the south-east corner of the mainland of Australia as shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Location of the state of Victoria, Australia (after G-MW, 2007) 
The northern boundary of Victoria follows the course of the Murray River, the overall flow 
regime of which is controlled by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) under 
cooperative arrangements with the states of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and 
Queensland.  
The course of the Murray River from its source in north-eastern Victoria to its mouth at 
Goolwa in South Australia is shown in Figure 2.  
   25
 
Figure 2: Map showing the course of the Murray River along the boundary between 
New South Wales and Victoria and through South Australia (After MDBC, 2007) 
 
The location of the Goulburn-Murray Water region in northern Victoria is shown in Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 3: The location of the Goulburn-Murray Water region (after G-MW, 2007) 
The extent of the G-MW channel distribution system within the Goulburn-Murray Water 
region is shown in Figure 4.    26
 
Figure 4: The location and extent of the irrigation areas supplied by the G-MW channel 
system in northern Victoria (after G-MW, 2007) 
Water is diverted from the Goulburn, Campaspe, Loddon and Murray Rivers to the channel 
system to supply gravity irrigators.  
There are two main channel distribution systems in the G-MW region. The Murray system 
comprises the Murray Valley and Torrumbarry irrigation areas. The Goulburn system 
includes the Shepparton, Central Goulburn, Rochester-Campaspe and Pyramid-Boort 
irrigation areas. Both systems are integral parts of the DSE water management system for 
northern Victoria. 
Surplus flows within the channel system outfall to drains which return water to the river 
system. Thus return flows from the Murray Valley, Shepparton, Central Goulburn and 
Rochester-Campaspe irrigation areas become inflows for the Torrumbarry irrigation area. As 
G-MW has delivery commitments for both Victorian and South Australian diverters 
downstream of the channel system, any water returning to the river that is not recycled within 
the channel system, including outflows from both the Torrumbarry and Pyramid-Boort 
irrigation areas, will help supply those customers situated below the channel system. The river 
town of Swan Hill, situated 133 river kilometres downstream from Torrumbarry Weir and 
1505 river kilometres upstream from the mouth of the Murray River (MDBC, 2006), is close 
to the western border of the G-MW channel system.   27
APPENDIX II 
THE CREATION AND SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF THE EXISTENCE OF 
VICTORIA’S FULLY INTEGRATED LAND AND WATER MANAGEMENT PLANS 
 
The capacity of the DSE water management system to recycle surface and sub-surface 
drainage water was threatened by salinity and nutrient pollution in the latter part of the 20
th 
century. Over the past three decades, the Victorian government, irrigators and local 
communities combined in joint action and spent hundreds of thousands of hours and billions 
of dollars in the development and implementation of land and water management plans for the 
northern irrigation region (SPAC, 1989). These plans are fully integrated water management 
systems (IWMSs) that protect water quality and thus enable complete recycling of virtually 
all surface and subsurface drainage water
13. Not surprisingly, water accounting procedures for 
an IWMS include credits for the volume of drainage water that is recycled by downstream 
activities. These credits fully offset any notional losses previously attributed to undelivered 
outflows in upstream components of the water supply system (Keller et al 1996). 
DSE was the managing government agency for the preparation of IWMSs for Victorian 
irrigation areas. This community led process involved the research and verification of the 
technical feasibility of potential management options by multi-agency technical working 
groups, followed by the development of integrated management plans incorporating preferred 
options. An assessment of the social, environmental and economic aspects of projects was 
carried out according to Government guidelines before any response to joint funding 
proposals was made (Anon, 1988).  
DSE remains the managing agency for the both the implementation and monitoring of land 
and water management plans. 
Given this background in the development and implementation of the overall IWMS for 
northern Victoria over the past 30 years, it is astonishing that in its information paper DSE 
now claims that:- 
“At present, about 30% of the water in the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District is lost as a 
result of leakage, seepage and evaporation in channels, meter inaccuracies and outflows at 
the end of channels. Total losses across the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District due to 
system inefficiencies have typically been in the order of 900 GL each year” (DSE 2007a) 
                                                      
13 There is some loss of channel water involved in the operation of public works combating salinity. 
In the Goulburn system, some groundwater (of which channel seepage can constitute only a very small 
proportion) is evaporated at Girgarre but most is shandied with surface water for recycling. 
In the Murray system, saline discharge generated by dryland artesian processes in the Loddon Valley 
(Macumber, 1985) is diverted from Barr Creek for evaporative disposal (MDBC, 2006). Under the 
local land and water management plan, the volume of good quality water diverted for evaporation is 
minimised by preventing channel water and run-off entering the creek. 
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DSE say the modernisation project is designed to “create new water” by reducing “system 
inefficiencies”. Apparently DSE believes “new water” or real water savings can be made 
because they now treat “system inefficiencies” as irretrievable water losses.  
Yet these “system inefficiencies” are simply undelivered outflows that flow on to become 
inflows for users in other parts of the IWMS for northern Victoria and the Murray River 
already developed and supervised by DSE.  
The current senior management of DSE appears to be either unaware of the existence of the 
government endorsed IWMS for northern Victoria for which their department is responsible 
or they are unable to appreciate its capacity to recycle any surplus water flows arising in the 
G-MW channel system. 
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APPENDIX III 
 
CAPACITY OF THE DSE INTEGRATED SYSTEM  
TO RECYCLE UNDELIVERED CHANNEL OUTFLOWS 
 
DSE (2007) has published expected diversions and metered deliveries for the Goulburn and 
Murray components of the G-MW channel distribution system as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Expected diversions and metered deliveries (GL) within the Goulburn and 
Murray components of the G-MW channel distribution system under 




Murray Component  Total Goulburn-
Murray System 
Inflow Scenario  Average  Reduced Average Reduced  Average Reduced
Diversions 1780  1350  1110 985  2890  2335 
Metered 
Deliveries 
1305 932  715 623  2020  1555 
“Losses due to 
system 
inefficiency” 
475 418  395 362 870  780 
“Total System 
Efficiency” 
 69%   63%    67% 
All diverted water (inflow to the channel system) other than metered deliveries is treated by 
DSE as being “losses due to system inefficiency”. DSE claims that, on average, 870 GL are 
lost every year due to system inefficiency. This is an example of incorrect thinking described 
by Keller et al (1996) where “drainage water is treated as though it flows to an ultimate 
“sink”. It simply drops out of the system or “disappears”. 
DSE has not explained where this ultimate sink is situated or how sufficient capacity exists to 
dispose of 870 GL every year. To annually dispose of 870 GL by evaporation a lake of at 
least 870 square kilometers in area would be required. The Southern Ocean could dispose of 
870 GL of drainage water but this sink lies at Goolwa 1500 river Murray River kilometres 
downstream of the G-MW channel system (Figure 2, Appendix 1). DSE has not revealed the 
whereabouts of an undiscovered lake capable of evaporating 870 GL of perfectly acceptable   30
irrigation water every year. Nor has it described a mechanism by which 870 GL of water 
could slip down the Murray River and into the sea completely unnoticed.  
G-MW and DSE reports show water is not accumulating in the regional groundwater system. 
Therefore there is no ultimate sink for undelivered channel outflows, and the DSE concept of 
“losses due to system inefficiency” is foolish nonsense. 
 
The only explanation for the non-accumulation of 870 GL of undelivered channel outflows is 
that this water is being recycled within the G-MW/DSE system. As Keller et al (1996) 
observe:-  
that “in practically all integrated water management systems, however, the 
drainage water stays in the system and is incorporated into the initial water 
supply for additional irrigation applications”.  
 
For example, in the G-MW channel system the outfalls and channel leaks of the Murray 
Valley, Shepparton, Central Goulburn and Rochester-Campaspe irrigation areas return to the 
Murray River above the off-take for the Torrumbarry irrigation area at Torrumbarry Weir 
(Figure 4).  
The volume of water right/high security water entitlement attached to G-MW irrigation areas 
is shown in Table 2. Based on the Distribution Efficiency reported by DSE in Table 1, 
509 GL of water would be diverted at Torrumbarry Weir in order to provide 341 GL of 
metered deliveries in a year when there is full allocation of water right. For the same level of 
allocation, the combined calculated total volume of outfalls and channel leaks
14 entering the 
surface drainage system that returns water to the Murray River from the Murray Valley, 
Shepparton, Central Goulburn and Rochester-Campaspe irrigation areas is 312 GL. This 
volume is 197 GL less than the necessary diversions to the Torrumbarry area and thus can be 
completely recycled. There is no need to reduce outfalls from the Murray Valley, Shepparton, 
Central Goulburn and Rochester-Campaspe irrigation areas to “save” water because the 
integrated channel distribution system has the capacity to recycle more than 1.6 times the 
calculated volume of outfalls and channel leaks
15.  
                                                      
14 By adding the percentages of unrecorded deliveries in Table 2 in the main paper to the percentage 
metered deliveries in Table 3 in the main paper, delivered channel outflows for the Goulburn and 
Murray systems are calculated as 78% and 76% of inflows respectively. Subtraction of the percentages 
of evaporation and seepage shown in Table 2 from the remaining undelivered outflows puts the DSE 
implied combined outfalls and channel leaks of the Goulburn and Murray Components at 20% and 
22% respectively. 
15 This relationship holds true whatever the level of seasonal allocation, provided the percentage 
allocation for the Murray component is at least as high as that for the Goulburn component of the G-
MW system.   31
Licensed pumping from the surface drains conducting undelivered outflows from G-MW 
channels to the Murray River further increases the recycling capacity of the whole system. 
 
Table 2: Volume of Water Right/High Security Water Entitlement allocated to 
irrigation areas supplied by G-MW channel system. 





Diversion required to 
supply Water Right 
based on reported 
distribution efficiency 
(GL) 
Calculated Volume of 
Outfalls and Channel 
Leaks  
(GL) 
Shepparton 182  263  53 
Central 
Goulburn 
385 558  113 
Rochester-
Campaspe 
187 272  55 
Pyramid-Boort 214  310  63 
Goulburn 
Component 
968  1403   
Murray Valley  274  408  91 
Torrumbarry 341  509  114 
Murray 
Component 
615  917   
Total G-MW 
Channel System 
1583  2320   
 
Recycling of the drainage outflows from the Pyramid-Boort and Torrumbarry irrigation areas 
occurs further down the Murray River as water is diverted into pumped pipeline systems 
supplying horticultural irrigation areas and stock and domestic requirements in Victoria or 
flows on to supply urban, industrial, irrigation and environmental demand in South Australia.  
 
Applying the DSE concept of efficiency to an isolated part of a much larger water distribution 
system ignores the potential for the recycling of the distribution inefficiencies in upstream 
parts by the downstream parts of the whole system. This ignorance results in serious 
underestimation of whole of system efficiency. For example, if is assumed the surface 
drainage from a channel system is 20% of channel inflow, firstly one and then a second cycle 
of reuse by downstream components of an integrated system would reduce this volume to 4% 
and then 0.8% of channel inflow respectively (Keller et al, 1996).    32
As there are plenty of opportunities for recycling within the DSE integrated water 
management system (DSE, 1989 onwards), losses due to system inefficiencies are 
insignificant. 
 
 